The drive for integration: Some comments by Markus, Hazel Rose
JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 17, 257-261 (198 1) 
The Drive for Integration: Some Comments 
HAZEL MARKUS 
Universiry of Michigan 
Received September 25. 1980 
In this article, Sanders has accomplished a thorough and impressive 
organization of the recent research that falls under the general rubric of 
“social facilitation.” The paper is notably successful in its attempts to 
pull together a wide-ranging literature, in its delineation of some of the 
common patterns of findings assumed to support each theoretical alter- 
native, and in its final suggestion that a synthesis of the various ap- 
proaches to social facilitation may be necessary to explain the phenom- 
enon fully. The article suffers, however, because Sanders apparently 
believes that a synthesis and integration of the various approaches to 
social facilitation can be best achieved by contrasting all approaches 
against the distraction/conflict model and then subsuming them under 
this view. Most of the article is devoted to various attempts at dem- 
onstrating the relatively greater validity of the distraction/conflict model. 
This results in a variety of difficulties including: (1) inappropriate com- 
parisons, (2) substitution of description and labeling for explanation, and 
(3) the premature exclusion of some more simple or minimal explanations 
of social facilitation. Each of these points will be discussed briefly below, 
but together these difficulties work to undermine what should be a major 
purpose of this type of article-the illustration of the potential generality 
and importance of the social facilitation phenomenon to an understanding 
of social behavior. 
With respect to the first point, I think it is questionable whether Sand- 
ers has accomplished an integration of the social facilitation research, 
as the title implies. Integration implies that there is conceptual and em- 
pirical similarity across the three approaches of mere presence, learned 
drive, and distraction/conflict. These approaches do indeed share the 
label “social facilitation,” but this nominal similarity masks the fact that 
these are three very different levels of explanation aimed at explaining 
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different aspects of the phenomenon. The categorization of the research 
in Table 1 and the accompanying figures indicating which theory has 
received the most confirmations generates a false contest among the 
three approaches. Within this group of experiments, a study which con- 
firms one theory does not necessarily serve to call into question or 
disconfirm another theory. Alternatively, a failure to disconfirm one 
theory does little to bolster our faith in another. How. then, are we to 
evaluate the results that distraction/conflict has been confirmed 80% of 
the time and not disconfirmed at all’? 
Here we must remind ourselves that the presence of similar effects, 
in this case, social facilitation (enhanced or impaired task performance), 
does not allow us to assume that the same variables are necessarily 
mediating these effects. Indeed, in several places throughout the article, 
the author states that the theories are not mutually exclusive and that 
they vary tremendously in complexity. In the final analysis, however, 
Sanders ignores his own admonitions and an attempt is made, presumably 
for the sake of parsimony, to subsume both mere presence and learned 
drive under one theory based on distraction/conflict. The result is a 
complex, multifactor theory, which may be on target for some social 
situations but which is decidedly overdrawn for other elementary forms 
of social facilitation. In the approach to theory testing that is assumed 
here, the big sprawling theory is pitted against the little theory, the simple 
theory against the more complex one and all that matters is how many 
of the theoretical predictions are confirmed. When the scores are tallied. 
the distraction/conflict theory wins, but what have we learned about the 
phenomenon of social facilitation’? 
For example, the studies focusing on a mere presence explanation do 
not claim to have developed a hypothesis that can account for ctfl classes 
of social facilitation. Instead mere presence was discussed as a su#?cirnt 
condition for social facilitation, The studies were concerned with dem- 
onstrating ‘the enhancement of an organism’s dominant responses by 
the simple physical presence of the species mate, independent of any 
informational or interactional influences the others may exert.” This is 
precisely the point where the Sanders’ review begins; it is his definition 
of social facilitation. It is his purpose to specify just IZOM! the simple 
presence of others works to enhance the dominant response. He offers 
the distraction/conflict explanation. While Sanders’ purpose is a useful 
and important one, it is quickly apparent why a comparison of mere 
presence and distraction/conflict is not particularly compelling. These 
two explanations are at different levels of the phenomenon. One is a 
general explanation for the social facilitation phenomenon-physical 
presence leads to dominant-response enhancement. The other accepts 
this relationship and then attempts to explain the mediating mechanisms. 
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Contrasting the two explanations is like arguing that the apple did not 
fall to the ground because of gravity but because the stem broke. 
If Sanders is to realize his goal of determining why or how drive 
induction takes place, the type of global comparison of outcomes per- 
formed here is not sufficient. What is needed instead is a careful task 
and response analysis so that it would be possible to determine which 
studies were really comparable. For example, the studies which claim 
to evaluate the mere presence hypothesis are quite disparate in their 
tasks, subject expectations, and response parameters. A close compar- 
ison of those studies in which the mere presence hypothesis is not con- 
firmed indicates that they are studies in which there has not been a clear 
“alone” condition as a comparison or baseline. Without this baseline, 
it is difficult to estimate how much social facilitation has been achieved 
by the mere presence of another. In many of these studies the subject 
is well aware of the experimenter in the “alone” condition. Once the 
experiment’s actual or implied presence is made salient to the subject, 
the task carries with it the promise of evaluation and gives rise to a 
variety of other outcomes such as competition, social comparison. and 
anxiety-factors that are quite likely to influence drive and thus to over- 
shadow the effects of just mere presence. Those studies which Sanders 
claims actively disconfirm the mere presence hypotheses are similar in 
that they introduce the additional factor of stress into the experimental 
situation. Stressing the subject may immediately elevate drive to such 
a level that it is no longer possible to evaluate the contribution of the 
mere presence of a conspecific. The larger point is that a more precise 
comparison of studies and the conditions of these studies is necessary 
before particular theoretical alternatives are discarded. 
Sanders’ attempts to explain all social facilitation phenomena within 
one frame work lead to the second difficulty with this review article- 
the substitution of elaborate labeling and description for explanation. 
The term “distraction/conflict” describes and labels what happens to an 
individual’s attention in the presence of another, but it does not explain 
drive induction. Is it the case that the cockroach runs faster in a maze 
because of a compelling need to overcome the distraction produced by 
a species mate? The distraction/conflict term may aptly describe the 
cockroach’s overt pattern of behavior, but does little to explain the 
general arousal or energizing of behavior produced by a conspecific. In 
fact, the primary contribution of the distraction/conflict hypothesis is to 
increase the assumed complexity of the phenomenon but it does not, in 
return, provide any greater a priori explanatory power. The theory is 
more specific with respect to what the subject might be doing in the 
presence of another but it is weak and lumpy when outlining the con- 
nection between distraction and response conflict and drive. With respect 
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to enhancement of the dominant response on simple tasks, we find that 
it is trying to overcome distraction that explains the effect. With respect 
to difficult tasks. facilitation of the dominant response (impairment of 
performance) may be a function of a decrease in attention caused by the 
presence of others, OK of trying too hard to overcome the distraction 
and doing poorly because the additional effort is facilitating the dominant 
(incorrect) response, 01’ both. 
The problem with the distraction/conflict hypothesis seems to rest with 
the concept of distraction. It is an ambiguous factor that has not been 
adequately conceptualized either here or in other work. Sanders. for 
example, ignores some relevant findings which suggest that distraction! 
conflict and drive are not substitutable variables. The effects of distrac- 
tion on behavior appear to habituate over trials while the effects of 
physical presence do not (cf. Zajonc. 1980). Again. it seems there is 
more to social facilitation than just distraction and response conflict. 
Also except for a few findings indicating that individuals feel more 
“distracted” in certain conditions. we have no evidence that what is 
labeled “distraction” is really distraction, no evidence that a division 
or conflict in response is actually taking place. In future studies. it would 
be useful to gather direct evidence about what the subject has attended 
to during the task. If we find social facilitation without evidence of 
attentional conflict we are left with the conclusion that it is not a nec- 
essary condition for the occurrence of socially induced drive. Alterna- 
tively, it may be found that attentional conflict does indeed occur but 
that it does not result in the predicted effects. We may see that what 
appears to result in overt response conflict in one aspect of the response 
may actually lead to improved performance on some other aspect of the 
response. Thus response latency in a task may be extended by the 
presence of another but memory or comprehension may be improved. 
This type of finding might lead us to consider more features of the 
response. to view social facilitation not as a unitary phenomenon-an 
all-or-none effect-but as a multicomponent process having a range of 
effects. Distraction/conflict may explain the initial phase of the response 
but some other concept may be needed to account for the energization 
of the response. Also, the effects of social facilitation may vary depending 
on the aspect of response (speed, accuracy. memory) under consideration. 
A too hasty or uncritical acceptance of the distraction/conflict model 
also leads to the third difficulty-a tendency to reject prematurely some 
other more simple explanations of the phenomenon. Although the social 
facilitation process may be quite complex depending on circumstances 
and conditions. the mediating mechanisms need not be. For example. 
the mere presence explanation of social facilitation was meant to be just 
such a simple explanation. It was not meant as a complete explanation 
for all social facilitation phenomena. rather, the intent was to examine 
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the minimal conditions under which an individual’s dominant response 
would be enhanced by the physical presence of a conspecific. It is an 
explanation that emphasized, granted not in very specific terms, that 
some aspects of the social nature of individuals may indeed be instinctual 
or hard-wired and that this social nature or attitude may be stimulated 
by the presence of another member of the species. Whatever this mech- 
anism was, it was thought to be simple, immediate in its effects, to 
consume only limited processing capacity, and not to require the indi- 
vidual’s cognitive participation, in the form of special understanding, 
inference, or explanation. The demonstration of the social facilitation 
effect across species, from humans to cockroaches, was an indication 
that the receptivity of the organism to the presence of another may 
indeed be controlled initially by just such very minimal mechanisms. 
Sanders’ integration, with its emphasis on active, attentive, or cognitively 
mediated behavior on the part of individual leads researchers to a position 
where they may ignore a variety of theoretical alternatives before they 
have been fully examined. 
In sum, Sanders’ article is useful in keeping alive the social facilitation 
problem, but I do not think the conclusion that the best direction for future 
research is to confirm the Attentional Processes model can be justified 
at this point. Simple hypotheses that do not do an adequate job in 
explaining the entire phenomenon of social facilitation should not be 
discarded in favor of larger, more complex hypotheses that are no more 
adequate. Sanders’ article suggests that the goal driving social facilitation 
research has changed. We are no longer interested in demonstrating just 
that an organism’s dominant response can be enhanced by the presence 
of a species mate. It can. We are now left with the question of how- 
and with the task of developing a theory of social facilitation. This type 
of theory development would be enhanced by a sharp definition of the 
problem including a set of conditions for identifying the dominant re- 
sponse, a more precise comparison of relevant studies, increased atten- 
tion to the relationship between various factors and drive induction, and 
a more complete synthesis of the various theoretical alternatives. A 
satisfactory synthesis might begin with the most simple explanations of 
social facilitation and then add factors as they are needed to account for 
the effect under various task demands and within different social 
contexts. 
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